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 Mobilitics: some results 
 conclusions 
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Our “personal spy assistant” 
 smartphones have become our companions 
 useful and user-friendly, always connected 
 easy to customize to match everybody expectations 
 ~20% of mobile phones are smartphones 
 but smartphones know a lot of our cyber-activities 
 they gather private information 
 while we’re using them 
 they generate private information 
 GPS, NFC, WiFi, camera 
 and they can potentially send it to remote servers 
 1st party and 3rd party (more annoying) servers 
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Privacy leakage example 1 




Privacy leakage example 2 
 Twitter (Feb. 2012): 
 “La fonctionnalité de recherche 
d'amis de […] Twitter permet au 
service en ligne de télécharger sur 
ses serveurs les carnets d’adresses 
et la liste de contacts des utilisateurs. 
Une fois téléchargées sur ses 
serveurs, ces données sont 
conservées 18 mois.” 
http://www.zdnet.fr/actualites/twitter-copie-et-conserve-18-mois-sans-consentement-les-
carnets-d-adresses-des-utilisateurs-39768632.htm 
 similar scandals with LinkedIn, Path and others in 2012! 
 those are strategic errors 
 big, renown companies have little to gain with such scandals 
 corrected promptly in new versions of the app 
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 data aggregation at Flurry 
•  http://www.flurry.com/flurry-analytics.html"
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Privacy leakage example 3 
About Mobile Ads 
 a way to monetize free (and non-free) Apps 
 makes sense 
 acceptable if done in a CNIL-compatible way, with 
informed users 
  some facts about mobile world advertising 
 many companies compete, some of them are well-known  
 but many others exist… 
 ref: http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/List_of_mobile_advertising_networks 
 Adfonic, Enpocket, Greystripe, inMobi, LeadBolt, Millennial 
Media, MobYD, Trademob, Velti Media, Mojiva, … 
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About Mobile Ads… 
 some facts 
 “77% of top 50 Android free Apps were Ad 
supported” on July 2011 [1] 
 35% of Android free Apps that use Ads use 2 or more 
Ad libraries [2] 
 a way to increase revenues 
 a trend is to use “Ad aggregators” 
who promise to select the Ad lib 




  [1] “Don’t kill my ads! Balancing Privacy in an Ad-Supported Mobile Application 
Market”, HotMobile 2012.  
  [2] “AdSplit: Separating smartphone advertising from applications”, Usenix Security 
2012. 
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About Mobile Ads… 
 it does impact the App behavior 
 Ad libs ask for potentially dangerous Android permissions 
 free Apps usually request 2-3 additional permissions 























































AdMob [22] ￿ ￿ ◦
Greystripe [25] ￿ ￿ ￿
Millennial
Media [36]
￿ ￿ ￿ ￿
InMobi [29] ￿ ◦ ◦ ◦
MobClix [38] ￿ ◦ ￿
TapJoy [53] ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿
JumpTap [32] ￿ ￿ ￿ ◦
￿(required), ◦ (optional)
permissions per Ad lib [2] 
So… 
 “tracking the trackers” has become 
   a necessity 
 “teach” companies to behave in a privacy- 
 friendly way 
 users must know the risks… 
 “teach” the end-user about privacy risks 
 users must be able to control the risks 
 and give them privacy tools 
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The Inria-CNIL Mobilitics project 






 focuses on Android and iOS 
 the leading mobile OS 
"
"
 analyze privacy leakage by Apps and OS services 
 compare Android/iOS, identify best practices and trends 
 gather facts that CNIL can use to discuss with companies 
"
"
 don’t be naïve 






 Mobilitics: some results 
 conclusions 
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About security and privacy 
 iOS and Android both feature secure boot 
 integrity verification from the bootloader up to Apps 
 
 it looks fine, but it’s not sufficient… 
 does not prevent any App to misbehave 
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immutable code + 
Apple root CA PK 
ROM 
LLB 
(low level bootloader) 














Issue 1- Apple or end-user must check well 
 two different models for App behavior control 
W.R.T. privacy 
 market centric: check an App prior to accept it on an 
official market 
 end-user centric: ask the user consent when an App 
wants to perform sensitive operations (at installation time 
or dynamically) 
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The market centric approach 
 traditionally Apple’s approach 
 the only solution in iOS5… 
 requires Apple does a good job in scrutinizing 
Apps before accepting them 
 Apple acts as a trusted party 
 many scandals in 2012 and our own discoveries 
demonstrate it’s not 100% reliable 
 problems come from official signed Apps found in the 
AppStore… 
 additionally the validation process is totally obscure  
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The end-user centric approach 
 give more control to the end-user… 
 …or get rid of your responsibility as a market validator? 
 two complementary point of views! 
 Android: at installation time 
 an App with “potentially dangerous requirements” needs 
to ask the user consent first, at installation time 
 responsibility is transferred to the user 




<uses-permission android:name="android.permission.SET_WALLPAPER" /> 
<uses-permission android:name="android.permission.INTERNET" /> 
 can we understand all the consequences of each 
authorization? No! 
 can we control the behavior of the App? Not really! 
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The end-user centric approach… (cont’) 
 iOS6: dynamically 
 done through the privacy dashboard 
 
 
 but several items are missing 
 Device Name 
 UDID (even if banned from new Apps) 
 Internet access 
 Advertising ID is really hidden elsewhere… 
 the user cannot control the behavior of the App 
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Issue 2- The consequences of jailbreaking 
 why? 
 “I want to use my device the way I want, rather than what 
Apple thinks I want…” 
 jailbreaking an iPhone implies 
  root access through software or hardware exploits 
  patching the kernel to get around Apple’s code signature 
verifications and other restrictions recently added 
1.  the law does not permit it in all countries… 
2.  … additionally 
 the “chain of trust” is broken! 
 any App can do whatever it wants 
•  example: keys can easily be compromised, the App acquires 









19 © Inria / Photo H. Raguet 
Mobilitics step 1: data collection 
 a two step process… 
 step 1: data collection on the phone with our 
Mobilitics App 
  collect events 
  send “sanitized” information to server 




 each App/service is independent 
 runs in a dedicated “sandbox” 
 accessing external information… 
 …requires to use the Apple 
 official API 
 
 ⇒ collecting data is done by instrumenting the API 
 the idea is simple, the difficulty is in the details 









Data being collected 
 we capture 
 access/manipulation/transmission** of personal data 
 contacts 
 geographic location 
 various device and user accounts 
 calendar 
 photos and videos 
 UDID and device name 
 voice memos 
 etc. 
**only for data sent in cleartext in v1, also with data sent 
encrypted in v2 
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Mobilitics step 2: off line analysis tools 
 step 2: off line analysis tools for visualization and 
statistics 
 statistics on the SQL server database 
 visualize the sensitive information kept of the phone 
 visualize the information sent to the server 
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Sensitive DB visualization tool 
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map showing phone location 
and movements for that day 
DB entries for that day 
(here sorted by their event time) 
subset of the Wifi AP and 
GSM/3G towers collected 
automatically 
time line (lists all the days of the field test to select the one of interest) 
current events 
show global stats 
start animation 
for that day 
Sensitive DB visualization tool… 
 per country view 
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Apps axis (most active on top) 
Private data axis Country axis 
(most active on the right) 
Sensitive DB visualization tool… 
 per organization view 
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Organization axis 
(most active on the right) 
Sensitive DB visualization tool… 
 an example: “DeviceName” access view 
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why does DrawFree 
access it 204 times? 
DeviceName 
access 
Quelques résultats (live test 1) 
 6 volontaires de la CNIL ont utilisé un iPhone 
“mobilitics” pendant 3 mois 
 novembre 2012 – janvier 2013 
 9 Go de données récoltées 
 7 millions d’événements récoltés 






Nombre d'applications : Total : 189   
Qui accèdent au réseau 176 93% 
Qui accèdent à l'UDID (identifiant unique Apple) 87 46% 
Qui accèdent à la géolocalisation 58 31% 
Qui accèdent au nom de l'appareil 30 16% 
Qui accèdent à des comptes 19 10% 
Qui accèdent au carnet d'adresses 15 8% 
Qui accèdent au compte Apple 4 2% 
Qui accèdent au calendrier 3 2% 
TABLEAU 1 – BILAN STATISTISQUE GLOBAL DE L’EXPERIMENTATION MOBILITICS 
 
1. Quelques confirmations :  
origin: 
La Géolocalisation: La reine des données 
 31% des applications utilisées ont accédé à la 
localisation 
 41 000 « événements » de géolocalisation au total  
 en moyenne 76 événements par jour et par volontaire 
 l’intensité de ces accès surprend 
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origin: 
Pourquoi accéder au nom de l’appareil? 
•  36 applications, soit un peu plus de 15% ont 
accédé à cette info 
•  l’usage fait de cette donnée est peu clair 
31 
origin: 
Les identifiants sont très demandés 
 l’UDID, un élément clef 
 idf intégré à l’iPhone qui n’est ni modifiable ni effaçable 
  Cet UDID est très « demandé » 
 87 applications sur 189 ont accédé à l’UDID (46%) 
 désormais banni, mais d’autres solutions sont là… 
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Il y a du travail pour améliorer la situation… 
 Apple/Google sont contraints… 
… de proposer des techniques pour redonner du contrôle à 




 elles sont peu utiles en l’état 
 limitées, contrôle à gros grain et conséquences obscures, 
sans analyse comportementale de l’application  
 induisent en erreur car elles sont contournées 
 « si c’est techniquement possible, j’ai le droit de le faire » 
 règne un flou total 
 un développeur qui inclue une bibliothèque publicitaire ne 
sait rien de son comportement… 
Un cas d’école : l’App RATP version 5.4.1 
 « Y’a pas de problèmes » 
dixit la RATP 
 Vraiment ? 
 la liste des Apps actives, mon 
adresse MAC, le nom de mon 
téléphone, ma position 
géographique précise (à 20m 
près), un identifiant permanent 
sont envoyés à Adgoji (ssl) et 
sofialys (en clair !) 
 Voir notre blog : part-1 et 
part-2: https://team.inria.fr/privatics/ 
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Thank you  
